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Universal Exceptionalism in International Law
Anu Bradford and Eric A. Posner1
February 3, 2010
Abstract. A trope of international law scholarship is that the United States is an
“exceptionalist” nation, one that takes a distinctive (frequently hostile, unilateralist, or
hypocritical) stance toward international law. However, all major powers are similarly
“exceptionalist,” in the sense that they take distinctive approaches to international law
that reflect their values and interests. We illustrate these arguments with discussions of
China, the European Union, and the United States. Charges of international-law
exceptionalism betray an undefended assumption that one particular view of international
law (for scholars, usually the European view) is universally valid.

Among international lawyers, it has long been conventional wisdom that the
United States acts differently from other states. In the nineteenth century, it kept to itself,
refusing to participate in the wars and alliances that preoccupied European powers. In the
twentieth century, it arrogated for itself the role of global leader. After World War II, the
United States was the primary force behind the construction of all the major international
institutions—the United Nations, including its human rights regime, the GATT/WTO
trade system, the development and financial institutions such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, and the security arrangement embodied by NATO. With
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was transformed from one of two
superpowers into the sole hyperpower.
And yet the United States has, throughout this entire period, showed ambivalence
about international law. More than any other state, the United States put financial and
diplomatic resources into advancing human rights; yet it refused to ratify most of the
major human rights treaties, and has committed major human rights violations, including
torture in its operations against Al Qaida. It promoted the trade system yet has from time
to time engaged in protectionist measures. It hosts the United Nations and is its largest
dues-payer, yet it has violated the UN Charter by launching wars without Security
Council approval and frequently has been in arrears on its dues. It helped negotiate a
number of important treaties—including the Law of the Sea Convention, the Rome
Statute, which created the International Criminal Court, and the Vienna Convention on
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Treaties—and then refused to ratify them. It has resisted numerous efforts to strengthen
the laws of war and to ban weapons such as landmines.2
In recent years, scholars have searched for explanations for this apparently
distinctive stance toward international law. The usual political-science theories of state
behavior assume that states act in roughly the same way. They might have different
capacities and populations, but they all seek to maximize their security (as the realists
argue) or to enhance national welfare (as rational institutionalists argue). So the recent
literature has sought explanations for America’s distinctive international behavior in
unique attributes of the United States.
The most common explanation today appeals to a long line of literature on
“American exceptionalism.” This literature, which goes back to Alexis de Tocqueville’s
Democracy in America, holds that the United States is different from all other countries.3
In Tocqueville’s time, the United States was the only large country with authentic
democratic institutions. Today, most countries are democracies but the United States
remains distinctive among them. Ideologically, the United States is more committed to
democracy (as opposed to rule by the elites), equality of opportunity (as opposed to
equality of outcomes), individualism (as opposed to collectivism), and the free market.
Culturally, Americans are more religious, more skeptical of authority, more militaristic,
and more patriotic.4 Institutionally, the country is more decentralized, more legalistic, and
more open to democratic participation.5
How might American exceptionalism explain America’s international behavior?
One argument is that Americans believe that the United States, as the preeminent nation,
perhaps one with a unique mission to promote freedom and democracy, cannot be
required to submit to international institutions.6 Another is that Americans are less liberal
than people in other countries, and so they oppose international legal change that
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liberalizes international relations to a degree beyond that of which Americans approve.7
Other explanations appeal to distinctive attributes of American political institutions—for
example, federalism and the high bar for ratifying treaties.8
In this paper, we attack the premise of these arguments. The American stance
toward international law is not distinctive or exceptional—or, put differently, the United
States is no more exceptional than any other powerful country. When creating
international norms, powerful nations characteristically advance interpretations of
international law that reflect their values and advance their interests. Similarly, powerful
nations’ willingness to ratify or comply with international norms hinges on the
consistency of those norms with their values and interests. This type of “exceptionalism”
is therefore not the exclusive preserve of one state. Today, the United States, China, and
the European Union (“EU”) advance conflicting interpretations of international law.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union did the same.9 The focus on
American exceptionalism blinds scholars to the similar behavior occurring elsewhere.10
We further argue that international law is best understood as an overlapping
consensus of the otherwise “exceptional” views of the great powers. At the core are legal
norms to which virtually every nation considers itself bound. Outside the core, there is a
conflict. In this area of conflict, nations make inconsistent claims as to the meaning of
international law. It is a significant mistake for scholars to accept the claims of any one
nation as to the meaning of international law in this disputed area. It is also a mistake to
dismiss a nations’ interpretation of a treaty (for example) as automatically wrong. As
long as nations disagree about the meaning of treaties and other sources of international
law, the content of international law remains unsettled.
This argument is not entirely new, though it seems to have been forgotten. Hans
Morgenthau’s influential realist treatise, Politics Among Nations, notes in passing that all
nations interpret or “misinterpret” international law so as to advance their ends, but he
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makes an exception for “codifications,” which we reject. 11 States offer self-interested
interpretations of codes and treaties just as they do for customary international law, which
was the focus of Morgenthau’s discussion. Lassa Oppenheim’s treatise on international
law notes, but rejects, attacks on the universality of international law by commentators
who argued that distinctive Soviet and German versions of international law existed
between the two world wars. “These and similar intrusions of national policies into the
sphere of International Law are essentially transient,” Oppenheim argues.12 We argue, by
contrast, that disagreements about international law among the great powers are persistent
and of great significance, although, as noted, a core of overlapping consensus does exist.
This paper describes the different “exceptionalisms” of the United States, China,
and the EU. For each state, we trace their “exceptional” international behavior to their
“exceptional” domestic interests, values, and institutions. While it is sometimes assumed
that the European position on international law is in fact the correct position on
international law,13 we argue that, in fact, the European position is just one among many
approaches to international law that reflect a mixture of national self-interest and national
(as opposed to universal) values. The United States looks less distinctive when compared
to the world as a whole, than when it is compared only to the European democracies.
Each exceptionalist state advances a particular version of international law that must be
judged on its merits against some standard of morality; the accusation of exceptionalism
is a straw-man attack.14
Our argument is descriptive, not normative. We do not argue that any country’s
view of international law is the correct one.
I. CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS
A. Universalism and Exceptionalism
By universalism, we refer to the view that the rules of international law apply to
all states. By exceptionalism, we refer to the view that the values of one particular
country should be reflected in the norms of international law. By exemptionalism, we
11

See HANS J. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
POWER AND PEACE 298-99 (Knopf 6th ed. 1985).
12
L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 56 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
13
See, e.g., our discussion of Michael Ignatieff’s views, infra Part I.B.
14
In the modern legal literature, the lone example of this view that we have found is Sabrina Safrin, The
Un-Exceptionalism of U.S. Exceptionalism, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1307 (2008), who argues that the
American stance to international law is not exceptional. Our argument builds on her work. Some skepticism
about the usefulness of the notion of American exceptionalism in international law can also be found in
Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United Against Terrorism, 45 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 323 (2009).
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refer to the claim that the rules of international law, or of certain international treaties,
should apply to all states except for one particular state.15
At one time, international law consisted of a set of contracts involving (usually)
pairs of states, along with some general norms of customary international law that were
derived from state practice and the official statements of governments and other state
institutions. Occasional multilateral treaties would address the resolution of military
conflicts involving multiple states such as the Napoleonic and Crimean Wars. In the
twentieth century, all this changed. Although states continued to enter bilateral treaties,
they increasingly established fora—notably, the United Nations—for negotiating treaties
involving issues of global concern, including the laws of war, human rights, protection of
the environment, trade, and regulation of the seas. All states would be invited to send
delegates to these conventions, and the expectation was always that the treaty obligations
would be the same for all states, large and small, rich and poor.
These practices have helped established a presumption of universalism. Once a
global problem is identified, it is understood that an international solution binding all
states should be sought. To be sure, states may continue to negotiate bilateral and
regional agreements to address narrow cross-border and regional problems, but these
agreements, though numerous, must be consistent with states’ obligations under
multilateral treaties.
We use the term exceptionalism to refer to the attitude of a state that believes that
it is a model or leader in international relations because of its unique attributes. The state
may hold that its institutions are the best in the world, or that it has a historical mission—
and for these reasons, the state’s commitments should be the world’s as well.
Exceptionalism does not imply exemptionalism. An exceptional state may choose to
comply with the rules of international law with which it disagrees. If it does violate the
rules of international law, or some of those rules, it argues that those rules are
inconsistent with international law properly understood. In doing so, it typically claims
that some alternative rules should apply to all states equally, including itself. Thus,
exceptional states need not abandon universalism, and indeed they rarely do. The
exceptional state need not take the next step of exemptionalism, and argue that the rules
apply to all other states but not itself. As we will see, this distinction is crucial;
exceptional states are often accused of exemptionalism, in most instances inaccurately.
To understand this difference, compare two arguments often made about the
United States’ attitude toward international law. Some people argue that the United States
15
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should be exempted from certain types of international criminal jurisdiction because
America sends soldiers around the world to promote democracy and keep the peace.16
This argument is exemptionalist. The United States has not made this argument; instead,
it has sought safeguards on criminal jurisdiction—such as the precondition of Security
Council authorization before the International Criminal Court can launch
investigations—that ensure that no state that takes proper steps to uphold the international
order will find its citizens in an international court. Thus, the United States has not
argued that it ought to be exempted from the rules.17 Instead, it has insisted—consistent
with exceptionalism—that American norms and practices should provide the basis for
international law.
Exceptional states—which are always great powers, although not all great powers
are exceptional states—characteristically advance universalistic views of international
law that embody those states’ exceptional norms. We can distinguish two stages at which
this occurs. First, exceptional states attempt to influence the development of international
norms during treaty negotiations, so that international law reflects their values and
interests. Exceptional states are hardly alone in this respect, but because of their greater
power, they are more often successful, generating resentment among other states. Second,
exceptional states attempt to influence the development of international norms at the
stage of compliance. They often assert interpretations of existing treaty obligations that
reflect their values and interests, in some cases following up these interpretations with
actions that other states regard as violations of international law. Again, normal states do
this as well, but exceptional states are far more aggressive and successful.
B. The Standard View: American Exceptionalism and European Universalism
Consider this seeming paradox: the United States has been the leader in advancing
human rights around the world since 1945, and yet at the same time it has both violated
human rights itself and coddled tyrants who violate rights. The United States led the way
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations, and the
International Covenant for Civil and “Political Rights, and has put economic and military
pressure on human-rights violating states—far more than any other state has. But it has
also, to quote Michael Ignatieff,
16

See Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 688, 696-99; see also 147 Cong. Rec. S10,042 (Oct. 2, 2001) (statement
of Sen. Helms) (supporting a bill aimed at hindering the International Criminal Court, because the United
States “owes it . . . to our men and women representing this country, both in the military and in civilian
agencies,” as they “get ready for a long campaign against global terrorists,” to protect their actions from
U.N. “second-guessing”).
17
The United States does benefit from its veto in the Security Council, and in this sense one might argue
that it seeks a system in which other states are bound to norms that it can avoid—de facto. We discuss this
argument in Part V.C.
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supported rights-abusing regimes from Pinochet’s Chile to Suharto’s
Indonesia; sought to scuttle the International Criminal Court, the capstone
of an enforceable global human rights regime; maintained practices—like
capital punishment—at variance with the human rights standards of other
democracies; engaged in unilateral preemptive military actions that other
states believe violate the UN Charter; failed to ratify the Convention on
the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women; and ignored UN bodies when they
criticized U.S. domestic rights practices.18
Of course, many other countries have engaged in the same practices; what makes the
United States exceptional is that it also is a global human rights leader.
There are in fact three strands of American exceptionalism. First, the United
States negotiates human rights treaties but ratifies them subject to reservations that cut
back on the scope of its obligations, fails to ratify them, or ratifies but violates them.
For instance, Ignatieff argues that the United States’ decision to attach conditions
to its ratification to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a major
human rights treaty, betrays exemptionalism.19 However, as Jack Goldsmith has pointed
out, virtually all western states have acted similarly; usually it is the authoritarian states
that do not bother to add reservations to human rights treaties which they then ignore.20
Ignatieff also notes that when the United States ratifies human rights treaties, it typically
provides that the provisions of the treaties are not binding as a matter of domestic law.
However, this is a difference of form, not substance: because in many of these states
international treaties do not enter domestic law without an independent legislative act, the
use of explicit provisions saying as much are unnecessary.
So if the United States is exemptionalist in Ignatieff’s sense, then so are many
other states. In fact, Ignatieff defines exemptionalism so broadly that it loses its meaning.
In the narrow sense in which we use it, none of the examples discussed by Ignatieff count
as exemptionalism, because in none of these examples did the United States claim that
rules should apply to others and not to itself. What is distinctive about the United States
is that it rejected rules favored by other states, refused to compromise, and instead argued
that all states (including the United States itself) should be subject to the rules that the
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United States preferred. This is classic exceptionalism, not exemptionalism. As we will
see, other states engage in similar exceptionalist behavior.
Second, the United States condemns enemies for human rights violations that the
United States itself commits, and turns a blind eye to friends who engage in the same
behavior. This point has been made most forcefully in the international law literature by
Harold Koh, who calls this type of exceptionalist behavior the use of double standards.21
However, the use of double standards is not distinctive behavior of exceptionalist states.
Indeed, double standards compromise exceptionalism: The exceptionalist state believes
that its institutions embody the best rules and those rules should apply to all, equally.
Double standards are better seen as the result of pragmatism (at best) or inconsistent
preferences (at worst), and characterize the behavior of all states, not just exceptionalist
states. A state that seeks to advance human rights finds that this policy conflicts with
other interests—including trade and security. The state might be willing to compromise
its ideals in order to satisfy the demands of interest groups, or inconsistent public
preferences. It might believe that in some settings security will advance human rights
more than a consistent line on human rights. When the United States applies double
standards, it simply acts like any other state.22
Third, American courts do not pay much attention to foreign judicial rulings when
interpreting U.S. constitutional law and, more generally, American constitutional norms
are outside the international mainstream, or at least the mainstream of developed and
democratic states.23 The judiciaries in foreign democracies are more likely to cite foreign
courts than American courts are. And most states have constitutionalized positive or
social rights—including rights to health care, to work, and to education—while the
United States has not. Most democratic states have also rejected the death penalty and
have weaker protections for speech and religious association than the United States does.
This refusal to go along with other democratic states can be seen as another manifestation
of American exceptionalism—here, within the realm of judicial behavior and
constitutionalism.
Of course, not all states are democratic. A large minority of states are
authoritarian, and many formally democratic states are either not democratic—the elites
pull the strings behind the scenes—or are unstable, and cycle between democracy and
dictatorship. The question arises why Ignatieff compares the United States to other
democratic states, and indeed he clearly has in mind the major European democracies,
plus Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, plus a handful of other places such as India
and South Africa. These states amount to less than a quarter of the nearly 200 states in
21
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existence. Ignatieff himself admits that he understands American exceptionalism against
the practices of democratic states.24
After a survey of possible reasons for American exceptionalism, Ignatieff
concludes that the most plausible explanation is that Americans are just not strongly
committed to liberalism.25 Assuming his diagnosis is correct, here again Ignatieff does
not pause to consider whether international law in fact embodies liberalism as he
understands it—that is, liberalism understood on the European social-democratic model.
The answer is surely no. Consider the top twenty most populous states in the world (in
order): China, India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria,
Russia, Japan, Mexico, the Philippines, Vietnam, Germany, Ethiopia, Egypt, Turkey,
Iran, the Democratic Republic of Congo, France. Aside from the ambiguous case of the
United States, only two states that embody European-style liberalism—Germany and
France—make it on the list, and only in the second half of it. Most of the states—China,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Russia, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Congo—are not
liberal at all.26 Iran is an authoritarian theocracy. China, Vietnam, and Russia are also
authoritarian regimes.
Only a person who identifies European norms with world norms could say that
the United States’ wavering commitment to liberalism—if that is the case—explains its
exceptionalism. This mistake—the confusion of European norms and universal
international norms—is central to the claim of American exceptionalism. On this view,
European norms reflect the universal norms of international law. We have not seen a
defense of this view; it seems to be merely assumed.27
24

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 20. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 147, 150 (giving a related argument that
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They are all classified as not free or partly free in Freedom House’s 2010 survey. See Freedom House,
Freedom in the World 2010: Global Data,
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2010).
27
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and international human rights law, favoring supranational legal and political institutions because “most
important legal and political principles […] transcend national boundaries and indeed exists to check
national governments.” See id. at 1975-76, 2005-06. Peters, supra note 2, describes American
exceptionalism against a background of global constitutional values that look suspiciously European. See
also Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 113, 117 (2005) (“We Europeans share this intuition: the international world will be how we are. And
we read international law in the image of our domestic legalism.”); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED
WEST 161 (2006) (describing Europeans’ continuing commitment to the Kantian cosmopolitan order and
contrasting that with American preference for hegemonic liberalism post 9/11).
25
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C. Multiple Exceptionalisms
Against the conventional wisdom, we propose an alternative hypothesis. We
argue that great powers typically advance a view of international law that embodies their
own normative commitments but are presented as universal commitments. During the
cold war, there were two exceptional states—the United States and the Soviet Union—
and each advanced a universalistic vision of international law. Today, there are three
exceptional states—the United States, the EU, 28 and China—and each advances a
distinctive vision of international law.
American exceptionalism. The United States believes that international law should
promote free markets and liberal democracy. Military force may be used by any country
against threats to this order.
European exceptionalism. Europeans believe that international law should
advance human rights (including positive or economic rights) and social welfare.
Europeans reject the unilateral use of military force. Instead of resorting to military force,
states should pool their sovereignty in international institutions that can resolve disputes.
Chinese exceptionalism. China takes the strictest line on sovereignty and contests
the use of military force against independent states. China also believes that international
law should impose less burdensome obligations on poor countries. According to China,
economic growth (at least, in poor countries) should take precedence over human rights.
The core of international law consists of the overlapping claims of these three
states. “Unexceptional” (or what we will call “normal”) countries usually do not bother to
advance distinctive visions of international law because they do not have the power to
affect the development of international law. These states mostly take the law as given and
try to modify it along the margin to suit their interests. There are some exceptions. In the
nineteenth century, the United States, while it was still weak, advanced a distinctive view
of international law, which may have influenced the development of international law.29
More often, weaker countries form blocs that advance a distinctive vision. For instance,
the non-aligned block that was active during the cold war has fallen in line behind China,
which by virtue of its power and size, is the natural leader of poorer countries. Brazil has
emerged as the leader of the G20, a coalition of the developing countries in the WTO,
which advances the developing country stance in the WTO negotiations with notable
collective clout. In addition, exceptional states often try to persuade normal states to sign
28

The EU is not technically a state and would better be described a quasi-state. However, we will refer to it
as a state for simplicity.
29
See OPPENHEIM, supra note 12, at 52.
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on to their particular exceptionalist view. The United States championed the negative
rights embedded in the ICCPR and the former Soviet Union championed the positive
rights embedded in the ICESCR; both examples reveal two exceptional states trying to
convince normal states to adopt their respective worldviews.30 Similarly, the EU often
requires normal states to subscribe to the EU’s vision of international law as a condition
for signing a trade agreement or acceding to the EU.
In the remainder of this paper, we will flesh out these arguments. For each state,
we will (1) describe its distinctive international legal vision; (2) explain the source of this
vision in domestic public opinion and institutional structure; and (3) show that states are
exceptional in the same way that the United States is exceptional.
II. EUROPEAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE PACIFIST SOCIAL WELFARE MODEL
A. European Exceptionalism Defined
1.

Human Rights

The EU maintains a strong commitment to international human rights. Because all
EU members have ratified all of the major international human rights treaties, one might
think that the EU’s position on human rights reflects universal values. However, the EU’s
position is distinctive. The EU has its own Charter of Fundamental Human Rights, which
in turn reflects in part human rights norms developed by the European Court of Justice.
These norms are, in fact, broader than those embodied in international treaties; they also
vary in some respects from the norms advanced by the other major states.
The most distinctive human rights commitment of the EU is its opposition to
capital punishment.31 The EU has sponsored multiple resolutions at the UN Commission
of Human Rights 32 and at the UN General Assembly, 33 calling for a moratorium or
30

MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 221-29 (2004).
Article 2 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights provides, “Everyone has the right to life” and,
“No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed.” See Charter of Fundamental Human Rights
of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. All EU member states have signed the 13th Protocol of the
2003 European Convention of Human Rights, which commits the signatories to the permanent abolition of
death penalty in all circumstances.
32
See, e.g., U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 56th Sess., 66th mtg. at
7–19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/SR.66 (Dec. 21, 2000), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G00/136/03/PDF/G0013603.pdf; U.N. Economic and Social
Council, Commission on Human Rights, 55th Sess., 58th mtg. at ¶¶ 38–44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/SR.58
(Oct. 19, 1999), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G99/132/70/PDF/G9913270.pdf.
33
See, e.g., Memorandum by the European Union at the 54th United Nations General Assembly 10 (Sept.
21, 1999), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/memo_en_99.pdf (last visited Aug. 17,
2009); European Union, EU Welcomes UN Vote Calling for a Global Moratorium on the Death Penalty,
EU/NR 118/07 (Nov. 16, 2007),
31
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outright abolition of capital punishment. The EU also discourages the death penalty
through its bilateral relations: It has criticized the US for including reservations in
international human rights treaties to preserve the death penalty,34 and filed amicus curiae
briefs in cases where the US Supreme Court has considered the suitability of capital
punishment for juvenile or mentally retarded criminal offendants.35 The EU has further
required the US to sign a treaty guaranteeing that it will not seek death penalty in murder
cases which involve a request for extradition from an EU member state.36
But not all of the EU’s positions on human rights are so broad. The American
commitment to freedom of speech and political association is stronger than the European
view. European human rights norms do not prohibit the suppression of parties and certain
types of derogatory speech protected by the American first amendment. Some American
criminal law protections (such as the exclusionary rule) have no counterpart in European
courts. As we will discuss later, China endorses a much stronger right to development
than the EU does. On China’s view, poor countries may abrogate other rights for the sake
of alleviating poverty and maintaining order; the EU does not believe that the right to
development can trump civil and political rights. While Europeans would argue that
China is simply giving less weight to those other rights than it should, a more accurate
description is that there is disagreement as to the relative weights of the right to
development and other rights when they conflict.
At times the EU’s commitment to human rights conflicts with its international law
obligations. In 2001, the Al Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, an organ of the UN
Security Council, placed the Saudi businessman Yassin Abdullah Kadi on a list of
individuals associated with Al Qaida. Under the Security Council resolution that
established the Sanctions Committee in 1999, all states have a legal obligation to freeze
the assets of the individuals on the Sanctions Committee’s list, including Kadi. The EU
adopted a regulation to implement the UN resolutions that called for the freezing of
http://www.eurunion.org/eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=91&Itemid=58 (last visited
Aug. 17, 2009).
34
See European Union, EU Demarche on the Death Penalty, Presented to the US Administration, arts. 6–7
(May
10,
2001),
http://www.eurunion.org/eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1959&Itemid=26.
35
European Commission, Background: EU Policy against the Death Penalty 2 (Sept. 2008),
http://www.eurunion.org/DPBackground-9-08.doc (last visited Aug. 17, 2009). See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas,
129 S. Ct. 290 (2008); Brief for the European Union and Members of the International Community as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Maharaj v. McDonough, 549 U.S. 1072 (2006); Brief for the European
Union and Members of the International Community as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
36
John R. Schmidt, The EU Campaign against the Death Penalty, 49(4) SURVIVAL 123, 127 (2007–2008).
See Peter Finn, Germany Reluctant to Aid Prosecution of Moussaoui, WASH. POST, June 11, 2002, at A1
(reporting on Germany’s threat to withhold evidence if the accused, Moussaoui, may be punished with the
death penalty).
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terrorist funds, including those of Kadi.37 Kadi subsequently challenged this regulation
before the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”). In 2008, the ECJ ruled that the Sanctions
Committee’s designation of Kadi did not bind the EU’s member states.38 The process
established by the Sanctions Committee offended fundamental human rights norms under
European law. Kadi did not have an adequate opportunity to challenge the placing of his
name on the Committee’s list, the ECJ held. Accordingly, European countries could not
freeze Kadi’s assets without violating Kadi’s due process rights and, consequently,
European law.
The ECJ’s judgment (indirectly) challenged provisions of international law aimed
against a major problem of international security and undermined the authority of the UN
Security Council. Declaring that “the obligations imposed by an international agreement
cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty,”39 the
ECJ elevated the human rights guarantees enshrined in EC Treaties and general principles
of European law above the UN-generated norms to fight terrorism.40 This was perceived
as a departure from the EU’s customary role as a staunch supporter of international law
and the integrity of the UN.41
2.

Social Welfare

The EU has sought to maintain a high level of what it calls “social protection,”
sometimes at the expense of its international law obligations. The EU insists on its right
to keep foreign products out of its market on grounds of food safety and other health
policy concerns, precaution in the field of biotechnology, cultural diversity and other
social welfare rights, even when doing so violates EU’s obligations under international
trade law.42
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Council Regulation 881/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 139) 9 (EC).
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council of the EU, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351, at ¶ 5,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0402:EN:HTML.
39
Id. at ¶ 5.
40
See id. The ECJ went on to add that even though the EU constitutional norms and the UN Charter exist
on a separate plane (consistent with the dualist view of international law), if they were to be classified
within the same hierarchy of norms within the EU’s legal order, UN Charter would be subordinate to the
EC Treaties and the general principles of law. See id. at ¶¶ 305–08.
41
Grainne de Burca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi, at 4–5,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1321313 (last visited Aug. 17, 2009). Joined Cases C402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council of the EU, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, at ¶ 38
(Jan. 16, 2008), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/c2_juris.htm (follow “C-402/05 P”
hyperlink; then follow “”C-402/05 P” hyperlink next to “Opinion”).
42
Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaidis, The European Union as a conflicted trade power, 13 J. EUR. PUB.
POL. 906, 922 (2006).
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The EU’s pursuit of social policies that conflict with trade liberalization has led to
challenges in the WTO. Most prominent, the EU’s social welfare objectives clashed with
its WTO obligations when the EU sought to prohibit the importation of hormone-treated
beef into the EU. Following a complaint from the US, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
ruled that the EU’s ban was not based on scientific evidence, and hence not justified
under the relevant WTO rules.43 Similarly, the EU sought to restrict US, Argentine, and
Canadian imports of agricultural and food products that contained genetically modified
organisms (“GMOs”). The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel found the EU’s restrictions
were contrary to its obligations under the WTO.44 Despite these rulings against the EU,
the EU has remained reluctant to modify its domestic policies, preferring to violate
international trade law and endure WTO-authorized trade sanctions.
Trade conditionality offers an effective instrument for the EU to export its social
welfare model abroad.45 In derogation from the principle of most-favored-nation (nondiscrimination among trading partners), the WTO allows developed countries to set up
preferential tariff schedules to developing countries under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP). The EU uses its GSP system to foster its preferred social policies in
the beneficiary countries: It rewards countries that ratify the main international
conventions on human rights, labor standards and sustainable development and punishes
countries that do not. 46 For instance, in 1997 the EU withdrew Myanmar’s GSP
privileges because of Myanmar’s forced labor practices. Similarly, Belarus lost its GSP
status in 2007 for persistent violations of labor rights, including rights to organize and to
engage in collective bargaining.47 The United States similarly uses the GSP scheme to
advance its distinctive view of international law. Thus, resorting to trade conditionality as
an instrument to advance one’s exceptionalist agenda is not a prerogative of a single
state—yet the set of values that the GSP scheme is used to promote differs depending on
the identity of the exceptionalist state that extends conditional preferences to its trade
partners.
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Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994),
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2009); Appellate Body Report,
European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
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Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, at Part VIII, §§ 8.14, 8.18, 8.34, 8.38 (Sept. 29,
2006).
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Meunier, supra note 42, at 913.
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AFF. REV. 561, 570 (2008).
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3. Pooling Sovereignty
The EU sees itself as the “frontrunner” and the “driving force” behind
international institutions.48 The countries that would later form or join the EU (aside from
Germany and other members of the defeated Axis) played an essential role in establishing
the post-WWII institutions, including the UN, the WTO and the Bretton Woods
institutions. The European Union itself is the outcome of sovereignty-sharing among its
27 members. While the EU does not have a common police force to enforce its law, its
member states have submitted to authentic legislative, judicial, and executive institutions
that issue legally binding orders that are routinely obeyed. A trope of EU public relations
is that if historic enemies on the European continent can pool sovereignty, then so can
countries throughout the world.
The Europeans also pooled their sovereignty by establishing a Council of Europe
whose membership extends to 47 countries and thus beyond the member states of the EU.
The Council of Europe seeks to advance democratic principles and human rights
throughout Europe based on the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).49
The Council of Europe also established a European Court of Human Rights, vested with a
jurisdiction to hear allegations of violations of the ECHR. Similarly, the EU has
participates enthusiastically in the UN human rights committees, forums, conferences,50
and has pursued numerous initiatives in the context of the UN Commission on Human
Rights.
The EU was also a prime supporter of the International Criminal Court. All 27
members of the European Union have joined the ICC, including those states which
48

European Commission, Communication, The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of
multilateralism, at § 1.1, COM (2003) 526 final (Sept. 10, 2003); see also European Commission,
Summary: The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/r0000
9_en.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2009).
49
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocol
No. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 224, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7dc13-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/0/englishanglais.pdf. The rights and freedoms secured by the ECHR
include, e.g., the right to life (abolishment of death penalty), the right to a fair hearing, the right to privacy,
freedom of expression, freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the protection of property. The
ECHR prohibits, e.g., torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, forced labour, arbitrary
and unlawful detention, and discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms secured by the
Convention.
50
These forums and conferences include, for instance, the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Third
Committee of the General Assembly, the Commission on the Situation of Women, the World Conference
against Racism of 2001, the UN General Assembly Special Session on Children of 2002. The EU is also
active in supporting the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR). See European Commission,
Communication, The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism, at § 1.1,
COM (2003) 526 final (Sept. 10, 2003) supra.
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needed to amend their constitutions in order to do so.51 The Rome Statute is among the
numerous multilateral treaties that the EU requires states to sign as a condition for
acceding to the EU.52 The EU also encourages ratification of the Rome Statute outside of
its immediate sphere of influence through accession, including sponsoring annual UN
Resolutions supporting the ICC.53
4. Presumptive Pacifism
The EU is skeptical about the use of military force. It sees itself as a “soft,”
“moral” or “normative” power that relies on its influence rather than force in maintaining
world peace. 54 European security strategy therefore calls for preventative efforts—
including the spreading of democratic ideals, human rights and reduction of poverty—as
means to peace and security.55 The EU describes “the distinctive European approach” to
international peace and security as follows:
[The EU has] worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and
inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting
51

ICC—States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited
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ICC statute).
52
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acceptance of the ICC); cf. Council Common Position on the International Criminal Court (June 16, 2003),
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GAOR, 63rd Sess., 45th plen. mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.45 (Nov. 11, 2008); U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess.,
57th plen. mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc. A/62/PV.57 (Nov. 26, 2007); U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 56th plen. mtg. at 1,
U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.56 (Nov. 20, 2006); U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 53rd plen. mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc.
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development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity.
The EU remains the biggest donor to countries in need. Long-term
engagement is required for lasting stabilization […] These achievements
are the results of a distinctive European approach to foreign and security
policy.56
The core of the European Security Strategy is that military force should only be used as a
last resort after all diplomatic means have been exhausted. The EU also rejects the
preventive war doctrine, and insists that the UN Security Council authorization must be
secured before force is deployed.
Despite the pacifist rhetoric, individual EU member states have engaged in
military operations in recent years—for example, in the war in Afghanistan, which was
authorized by the Security Council. EU members have even used military force without
international legal justification. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 violated
international law because it did not serve any country’s defensive purposes, and it was
not authorized by the UN Security Council. Although France and Germany opposed the
invasion, the UK, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain (in addition to a
number of European countries that acceded to the EU the year following the Iraq
invasion) contributed troops to the mission. In 1999, all of the European members of
NATO, plus France, went to war against Serbia, again under the leadership of the US.
The intervention violated international law: it was not a war of self-defense and it lacked
Security Council authorization. NATO characterized the military operation as a
humanitarian intervention that was designed to stop the ethnic cleansing Serbs
orchestrated against Albanians in Kosovo. 57 The military alliance stepped in when an
individual state (Serbia)—and subsequently the UN Security Council—failed to
discharge their responsibilities to protect individuals amid an exceptionally grave,
unfolding humanitarian catastrophe.58
There are two important observations here. First, the European view on the
legality of the use of force is distinctive. The dominant view among the European
countries is that military force should be used only as a last resort, ideally (although not
necessarily) with Security Council authorization, and in the service of humanitarian
56

COMMISSION REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 55,
at 2.
57
Transcript of March 25, 1999 Press Conference by Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana and SACEUR,
Gen. Wesley Clark, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2009). Javier
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Foreign and Security Policy, justified the bombing as necessary to “stop further humanitarian catastrophe.”
58
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
xi-xiii (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf (giving a synopsis of the
principles of R2P and the guidelines for determining whether military intervention is justified).
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ideals—a point emphasized by Tony Blair in justifying British participation in the Iraq
war, and made more generally during the Kosovo intervention. The U.S. and Chinese
views, as we will see, differ. Second, the EU has been willing to assert aggressive
interpretations of international law in order to justify their position. Thus, the idea that
“humanitarian intervention” could be legally justified even without Security Council
authorization emerged during the Kosovo intervention.
B. Explaining European Exceptionalism
1. Domestic Policy Preferences: Social Welfare, Human Rights, and Pacifism
European public opinion supports the “social market economy,” a compromise
between socialism and laissez-faire capitalism that features a generous safety net, some
industrial policy, strong unions, and more intrusive market regulation than one finds in
the United States. 59 Of course, the United States and nearly every other developed
country similarly supplies a minimum safety net and regulates the market. But the faith in
the role of the government as the provider of social welfare seems to be a more central
part of the European identity than it is in most other western countries.
These commitments are reflected in the EU’s trade policy. Although critics allege
that the EU’s breach of WTO rules in the cases of beef hormones and GMOs reflect
protectionism,60 and without doubt the European producers of hormone- and GMO-free
products benefit from the EU’s insistence that free trade must occasionally yield to health
concerns, 61 the EU has asserted that it is merely responding to European consumers’
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concerns about food safety. Public sentiment within the EU is skeptical of GMOs and
hormones in food. A 2006 survey of European consumers revealed that 62% of the
respondents across the EU were “worried” about the food safety risks posed by GMOs.62
A similar opinion poll from 2001 showed 71% of the Europeans do not want GMOs in
their food.63 Regarding hormones, a 1998 Eurobarometer survey shows that 54% of those
surveyed indicated it important for food safety that food was “100% free from
hormones.”64 These surveys show that the import-competing industries are not alone in
urging the EU to violate WTO law when social policy considerations so warrant.
Turning to reasons behind EU’s human rights advocacy and presumptive
pacifism, Europe’s recent history of wars and violence stands prominently among them.
The extreme nationalism and the brutality of two world wars implanted revulsion for war
and engrained the ideals of human dignity and pacifism deep within the European
mindset. The legacy of wars and violence has heightened the EU’s concern for human
rights. For instance, large-scale state-sanctioned violence that the Europeans endured
partly explains why the opposition to the death penalty is the paramount concern in EU’s
external human rights policy.65
These experiences have also caused the EU to largely refrain from using military
force and pursue peaceful means to solve international disputes. The EU has not
established a European army. Rather, it considers itself a “civilian power” that pre-empts
military conflicts through institutional engagement and diplomacy. This explains why
most EU countries did not share the United States’ concerns about joining the ICC: states
that are frequently engaged in military operations abroad are aware that their soldiers
might one day be forced to stand a trial before the ICC. This threat was not significant for
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most EU states, which are rarely involved in international military conflicts.66 Only the
UK and France, both with extensive military capacities, initially expressed reservations
about the ICC but assented to the other EU members’ joint position in the end.67
This explanation of the presumptive pacifism of Europe should not, however, be
taken too far. Britain and France used considerable violence to prevent the loss of their
colonies after World War II. Britain fought a war in Malaysia. France fought wars in
Indochina and North Africa. Both countries participated in an ill-fated attack on Egypt in
1956. Despite the absence of a European army, all the major European countries have
maintained large armies. They participated in the 1999 Kosovo War, the 1991 Gulf War,
the war in Afghanistan, and (many of them, above all Britain) the 2003 Iraq War.
European countries also did not make the promotion of democracy and human rights a
priority in international relations until relatively recently—at best, the last two decades.
Thus, European pacifism is a rational response to the current global distribution of
military power as it is a reflection of a European ideology. Europeans remain hostile
towards unilateral use of force simply because Europeans have no capacity to engage in
unilateral military action themselves. 68 Insisting on multilateralism ensures that
Europeans have a vote on whether and when US troops are dispatched to fight for
international peace and security. The relatively benign U.S. hegemony (in European eyes)
also enables Europeans to embrace pacifism: as long as the United States keeps the world
peace, Europe does not need spend money on armies and take the risks of war. 69
Europeans are content with watching from the sidelines when Americans engage in wars,
preferring to expand their social welfare system with the funds they save while abstaining
from the role of a global policeman.
2. Institutional Structure
The European countries have had disproportionate influence over the creation of
current multilateral institutions. The voting power in the existing institutions, including
the UN and Bretton Woods institutions, reflects the distribution of power in the world
following WWII: The EU member states hold two of the five permanent and two of the
ten nonpermanent seats in the UN Security Council. Similarly, the EU (together with the
US) wields disproportionate influence in the IMF and the World Bank. In light of this,
the EU’s enthusiasm for preserving existing institutional cooperation is hardly surprising.
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The EU has been successful in incorporating its vision into many multilateral
arrangements, including treaties as diverse as the TRIPs Agreement, Landmines treaty,
the Rome Statute, and the Kyoto Protocol. The EU’s “hybrid” institutional structure helps
the EU to shape international agreements and institutions towards its preferences.70 The
EU often bargains as a single entity, enjoying the leverage of the biggest trading block in
the world.71 However, when it comes time to vote, the EU casts 27 votes on the matter.
The EU can also refrain from making commitments, using the argument that the
European Commission negotiates as a constrained agent of the member states. 72 For
instance, the Commission can resist demands to remove agricultural protection by saying
that it cannot secure the backing of the French farmers for the proposal. Presenting the
“French problem” as an “EU problem,” the French farmers’ demands suddenly enjoy the
bargaining power of a trading block speaking on behalf of 500 million consumers.73 The
EU may therefore be more eager to join an international agreement than other states
because its bargaining tactics give member nations more power to affect the agreement’s
content.
The EU’s own experience with integration may explain why the EU strongly
advocates the pooling of sovereignty internationally. The long experience with
integration in Europe has eroded the rhetorical power of “sovereignty”—the notion,
deeply entrenched in the United States and China that any loss of authority to
supranational institutions is an intolerable affront to the dignity of a state. The EU also
considers itself to be a thriving example of how international conflicts can be overcome
and how countries can peacefully co-exist and prosper. As we discuss below, in
comparing the EU to the United States, European countries have a less populist form of
democracy than the United States does, and so lacks populist skepticism of remote
bureaucracies. 74 European experience with fascism in the Second World War left the
Europeans skeptical of popular democracy. An important function of international law is
therefore to act as an antinationalist force by checking national sovereignty and guarding
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states against “democratic excess.” 75 As a result, there is less popular resistance in
Europe to delegation of authority to international agencies.
Finally, the EU advocates strong multilateral institutions, in particular security
institutions, because of its own limited ability to engage in unilateralism. While the EU
member states have pooled their sovereignty on many issues of economic importance, the
common foreign and security policy of the EU is limited. Any decision relating to
security policy is subject to the requirement of unanimity among the 27 member states.
There is also no common European military force that can be dispatched to intervene in
international conflicts. Insisting on obtaining UN Security Council authorization for the
use of military force thus rarely constrains the EU’s own military ambitious yet gives its
important member states, France and the United Kingdom, a right to a veto any attempt
by the United States to exercise force unilaterally. Thus, as long as the EU continues to
lack a strong, unified European military force, it is likely to prefer constraining other
exceptionalist states’ unilateralism thorough the disproportionate influence it wields in
the UN Security Council.
III. CHINESE EXCEPTIONALISM: MINIMALIST DEVELOPMENTALISM
A. Chinese Exceptionalism Defined
1. Strict Sovereignty
China’s vision of international law rests on the principle of sovereignty. Under the
Chinese view, sovereign states have an inalienable right to exercise jurisdiction over their
territories and their people without interference from other states.76 The internal affairs of
a state are left for the state’s own people to govern; international affairs are decided by
consultation among states acting on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.77 While the
integrated global economy inevitably compromises states’ economic sovereignty,
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military, political, and cultural sovereignty remain inviolable. 78 Consequently, China
rejects all perceived attempts to undermine its sovereignty, including criticism of its
human right policies.79
China bases its vision of international law on the “Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence,” which were first established in an agreement between China and India in
1954. These principles are “mutual respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
other states; mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in the internal affairs of
other states; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.” 80 Since then, these
principles have become a guiding doctrine of international relations for Chinese
scholars.81 Of these principles, the most elemental under the Chinese view is the principle
of sovereignty.82 In commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Five Principles in 2004,
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao referred to sovereignty as “the birthmark of any
independent state, the crystallization of its national interests and the best safeguard of all
it holds dear.”83
As a part of its efforts to promote a world order based on the principle of
sovereignty, China accords strong authority to the UN Charter and the Security Council.84
Qian Qichen, former foreign minister of China, gave special emphasis to the UN’s role in
maintaining a pluralist world, describing the UN as the “most universal, representative,
and authoritative international organization in the world.”85 Moreover, Qian called on
states to uphold the UN’s authority and acknowledge the dominant role of the Security
Council in conducing international affairs.86
China has applied this view of international law to maintain its position that
human rights concerns do not trump the principle of sovereignty. China regularly defies
the UN’s, foreign countries’, and NGOs’ criticisms of its human rights record.87 It resists
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the western concept of human rights as incompatible with its non-western and nondemocratic society. Under this view, advancement of norms relating to human rights and
democratic governance presumes a hierarchy of civilizations, and leads to an imposition
of one’s culture and values on others.
China has also opposed UN human rights resolutions against individual countries,
fearing that such resolutions are primarily tools to exert political pressure on developing
countries.88 In January 2007, for instance, China used its veto in the UN Security Council
to block a resolution denouncing human right violations in Myanmar. In doing so, it
argued that the UN Charter grants the Security Council authority to intervene in the
internal affairs of a state only if there is a threat to international peace and security. This
criterion, according to China, was not met in case of Myanmar. 89 Similarly, China
opposed a proposed Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention in
Kosovo in 1998, asserting that the Kosovo matter was an internal affair of the state.90
The United States and European Union have challenged China’s non-intervention
policy and called on China to support responsible humanitarian intervention. Recently,
China has—slowly and reluctantly—backed away from its earlier stance that state
sovereignty can never be compromised on humanitarian grounds.91 Concerned over its
international reputation, China reversed its position on Myanmar and supported a
subsequent UN Security Council statement condemning Myanmar’s violent suppression
of peaceful demonstrators in the fall of 2007.92 China also pressed Sudan to accept the
UN and African Union peacekeepers in Darfur.93 Still, it is unlikely that China will depart
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from its non-interference principle except in exceptional circumstances.94 China’s official
position on humanitarian intervention continues to be a minimalist one: intervention is
justified only in response to a target state’s request to intervene, and only if UN
authorization is first secured.95
The principle of sovereignty also dominates China’s position toward the ICC. The
ICC Treaty grants the ICC jurisdiction to try individuals for genocide, war crimes and
crimes against humanity, provided that those individuals’ own states are unwilling or
unable to investigate or prosecute the case. This precondition, called the
“complementarity principle,” dissuaded China from signing the Treaty in the end, even
though it participated in the treaty negotiations. China maintained that “jurisdictional
sovereignty of states should be strengthened rather than compromised.”96 China opposed
the complementarity principle on the grounds that the ICC’s decision to pronounce a state
unable or unwilling to prosecute a case could be politically motivated. In refusing to
expose its domestic criminal justice system to a possible review by the ICC, 97 China
confirmed that state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference are the key
ordering principles of its vision of international law.
2. Developmentalism
Even with China’s emphasis on the principle of sovereign equality, China does
not envision that all sovereign states should have equal rights and responsibilities.
Instead, the Chinese view maintains that states’ international obligations ought to be
adjusted to their different stages of development and their unequal capacities to comply
with international law. For the Chinese, the right to development is a fundamental
principle of international law. Developed countries are in a better position to maintain
international order. 98 Consequently, they must accept more burdensome obligations in
providing public goods, including a clean environment or liberal trade order. In contrast,
developing countries are entitled to various exceptions that reflect their lesser abilities to
assume international obligations. Accordingly, China advances a vision of international
law that is grounded on the idea of fairness and redistribution.
This developmental perspective guides China’s position on international
environmental law. When negotiating states’ responsibilities to reduce greenhouse gas
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emissions under the UN Framework Convention of Climate Change and the Kyoto
Protocol, China supported the Convention but resisted the imposition of binding
obligations on developing countries. According to China, developed countries should
bear the primary responsibility for global environmental protection due to their higher
level of industrialization and, consequently, their disproportionate contribution to climate
change. Developed countries also have the resources to invest in technologies that enable
them to reduce the harm caused on the environment. China’s position, which ultimately
prevailed, reflects the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”—
“common,” because climate change entails risks that affect all states; “differentiated,” to
suggest that not all states have to contribute equally in reducing or eliminating those
mutual risks. Instead, this view stresses that wealthier states should assume a greater
share of the burden of fighting the climate change.99 While promulgating its commitment
to (non-binding) emission cut targets during the 2009 Copenhagen climate change
negotiations, China continued to insist that developed countries must assume the
leadership role in fighting climate change.100
Similarly, in the WTO, China supports the principle of special and differential
treatment, which allows for various exceptions and preferences for developing countries.
For instance, developing countries benefit from an “enabling clause” that
permits derogations to the non-discriminatory treatment in favor of developing
countries. 101 The enabling clause therefore forms an exception to the principle of
reciprocity, which calls for the exchange of balanced concessions among states. In
practice, this means that developed countries extend preferential tariff schedules to
developing countries without offering the same concessions to their other (developed
country) trading partners. Nor do developing countries need to open their domestic
markets to the same extent as developed countries. 102 Developing countries are also

99

Christopher D. Stone, Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L
L. 276, 276-77, 279 (2004).
100
National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China, Implementation of
the Bali Roadmap: China’s Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (May 20, 2009),
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/t20090521_280382.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
101
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord
differential and more favorable treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to
other contracting parties.” Differential and Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, L/4903 at ¶ 1 (1979).
102
The preferential tariff treatment of developing countries is often administered under domestic
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs, which the enabling clause allows individual states to
set up. The United States, for instance, provides a duty-free entry for about 4,800 designated products from
over 130 beneficiary countries and territories. These do not include China. See Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, Information on Countries Eligible for GSP,
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ATT%20(A)%20-%20090417%20GSP_BDC.pdf (last visited Aug.
7, 2009).

27

eligible for transitional periods to allow them to adjust to surges in foreign imports, and
to technical assistance to help them implement new WTO commitments.
China’s approach to international human rights also follows the logic of
developmentalism. According to Chinese policy, the key human right is the right to
development, which trumps all other rights in the hierarchy of the human rights
discourse.103 Civil and political rights have to yield, when necessary, to the larger goal of
economic development.104 The Chinese view on human rights also emphasizes collective
rights over individual rights. Human rights are not understood to be inalienable rights that
precede the existence of the state. Rather, China emphasizes that human rights derive
from the State, which can grant those rights, subject to conditions.105 Since human rights
derive from the State, China argues, nations will vary in their understanding of human
rights based on their national traditions and level of economic development. For China,
human rights is a concept steeped in cultural and economic relativism; there is no such
thing as a universal human right.
China’s pursuit of redistribution of power and wealth from North to South is
characteristic of the developing countries’ decades-strong trend of calling for special
treatment and more equitable division of wealth. In the 1970s and 1980s, developing
countries advanced proposals for a “New International Economic Order” (“NIEO”)
through the United Nations. This culminated in the adoption of the Resolution for a
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States by the UN General Assembly in
1974.106 The idea behind the NIEO and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties was
to offer an alternative to the western-dominated Bretton Woods institutions and revise the
international economic system in favor of developing countries. Arguing that they
deserved restitution for the economic and social costs of colonization, developing
countries demanded trade concessions and more generous foreign aid than they had
received in the past. 107 They also demanded the right to expropriate foreign property
without paying full compensation. While China was never able to claim restitution
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relating to colonization, it follows the legacy of the NIEO by holding that states should
grant special treatment to developing countries in key areas of international law.108
B. Explaining Chinese Exceptionalism
1. Domestic Policy Preferences: Economic Growth and Reduction of Poverty
China’s staggering growth rates have transformed China from a rural undeveloped
country to an economic powerhouse.109 With GDP exceeding $4 trillion, China has the
third largest economy in the world after the United States and Japan.110 China’s massive
trade surplus has allowed it to accumulate over $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves.111
Few would question that China has emerged as an economic giant that wields significant
power in the global economy.
Despite its astounding economic growth, China remains a poor country. With the
GDP per capita of about $6,000,112 China ranks 101st in the world. Lifting people out of
poverty is of the utmost concern to the vast majority of the Chinese people. Acquiescence
in authoritarian rule rests in part on the Chinese government’s ability to pursue economic
growth, alleviate poverty and spread wealth to an increasing share of its population.
China’s rapid economic rise has had the downside of increasing economic inequality
within China, heightening the risk of political tensions. There is ethnic and religious
conflict in the west, and civil unrest throughout the country. The Chinese government has
determined that only continued high economic growth can maintain social order and
political stability.113
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In its quest for continuing economic growth, China pursues an export-led growth
strategy, and manipulates its currency so as to keep the prices of its exports artificially
low. To further facilitate its trade, China acceded to the WTO as a developing country,
taking advantage of the special and differential treatment available for developing
countries.114 Special and differential treatment allows developing countries to benefit
from longer time periods for implementing WTO commitments. These provisions also
allow developed countries to increase trading opportunities for developing countries
without offering comparable opportunities for other WTO member states.
China has also insisted on special and differential treatment in global climate
change negotiations. In 2006, China passed the United States as the largest emitter of
greenhouse gases in the world, and China’s emissions continue to grow at a very high
rate. 115 China’s high rate of emissions is the result of its booming economy and
consequent high use of energy in manufacturing. China’s comparative advantage in
international manufacturing is partly based on low energy costs due to its large coal
reserves. Thus, China has weak incentives to switch to alternative fuel sources and sign
any international treaty that would force it to do so.
To resist demands for significant cuts in its emissions, China has advocated a
developmentalist response to climate change. It has proposed to use countries’ historical
emissions as a benchmark for assigning emission reduction targets among states. Over
the course of the history of industrialization, most emissions originated from developed
countries when they were pursuing greater levels of development; akin to what China is
currently doing. Alternatively, China has suggested that per capita emissions should form
a baseline for contemplated emission reductions. Using per capita emissions as a
benchmark for the state’s global responsibility would have a very different impact on
populous China’s responsibilities than any metric focusing on total emissions: China’s
current per capita emissions are only one-sixth of that of the US.116
China’s position on international human rights can also be seen through the lens
of developmentalism. Against the western idea that political and civil rights take
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precedence, China argues that these rights must be subordinated when they conflict with
measures that promote economic growth and maintain political stability that is necessary
for growth.
2. Institutional Structure: Authoritarianism
Insisting on respect for the diversity of political, cultural, and social systems,117
China has resisted the ideals of democratic governance that threaten the core values of the
one Party-state and the Chinese government’s ability to secure domestic political and
social stability.118 Thus, Chinese notion of human rights is tilted in favor of economic and
social rights at the expense of civil and political rights. As Gerald Chan has observed:
Under China’s political structure and culture, human rights are granted by
the state and can easily be taken away by the state. If individual human
rights run against state interests, the latter will usually prevail.119
International norms that protect political rights pose the greatest threat to the stability of
the Chinese government. China may fear that consenting to any such norms would
establish a focal point for dissident activity and lead to a more visible demand for
political freedoms—a development that would resemble the signing of the Helsinki
Accords, a 1975 agreement between the Western countries and the Soviet-bloc countries,
which was widely seen to have fueled political dissident activity in the Soviet satellites
and ultimately contributed to the collapse of communism.120
The United States and other western democracies have long predicted that
China’s receptiveness to economic globalization and liberal market institutions would
spur political change in China. Yet the link between economic liberalization and
democratization in China has proved to be elusive. China has enjoyed economic benefits
from liberal international institutions while resisting any political liberalization that was
117
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expected to follow from its increasing international engagement. The Chinese
government has also nurtured a sentiment among its citizenry that the Western-style
democracy would be unsuitable for China’s current economic conditions. According to
the government, embracing civil and political rights incorporated in international human
rights treaties would destabilize Chinese society and endanger its pursuit of economic
welfare for the benefit of its citizens. This has resonated with many Chinese, who want to
avoid China undergoing the social instability, weak economic growth, and declining
national influence that Russia experienced after the Soviet Union collapsed. Chinese
citizens’ support for the current regime is also fueled by some degree of nationalism and
anti-Americanism, making them more receptive to authoritarianism and skeptical of the
“imposition” of American-style democracy through international norms. 121
Authoritarianism has also persisted as Western powers have pursued economic
engagement with China rather than trying to influence China’s human rights policies.
Despite its skepticism of many UN initiatives relating to individual rights, China
views the UN as helpful in promoting China’s vision of international law. The UN does
not pose a threat to China’s authoritarian government because of the exceptional status
and influence China holds within the organization. As a permanent member of the
Security Council, armed with a veto right, China knows that it can single-handedly
prevent any UN action that adversely affects China’s interests. The UN is not a
democratic organ, and that suits China. Rather, the UN is a forum where China enjoys an
equal voice with the other great powers. The Security Council seat also provides China’s
its most effective means to balance and constrain US power.122 China is therefore eager
to maintain the current structure of the UN system and offers its unwavering support for
the authority of the UN Security Council.123
IV. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM REVISITED: PRO-MARKET DEMOCRACY
A. American Exceptionalism Defined
1. Negative Liberties and Markets
The United States has a longstanding commitment to political and civil rights.
These commitments are reflected in the United States’ attitude toward human rights
treaties. The United States has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the human rights treaty that embodies the standard list of civil and political rights.
121

Ying Ma, China’s Stubborn Anti-Democracy, 141 POLICY REV. 3, 11 (Feb./Mar. 2007).
See supra note 79.
123
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Towards an Enhanced Role of the UN
Security Council in Maintaining Peace and Security (Nov. 21, 2003),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/zyjh/t45317.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2009).
122

32

It has refused to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, the human rights treaty that embodies the standard list of social, economic, and
cultural rights. The United States’ approach to other human rights treaties fits this pattern.
Rights to be free from torture and genocide are derived from civil and political rights that
prohibit the government from abusing its citizens; accordingly, the United States has
ratified the Torture and Genocide conventions. Other treaties, for example, those
promoting the rights of children and disabled persons, concern social rights which the
United States defines more narrowly; they have not been ratified.
These commitments are also reflected in American foreign policy.124 The U.S.
State Department compiles an annual report that criticizes foreign countries for violating
human rights. Each country report follows a template that focuses on civil and political
rights—including free speech and association, religious freedom, torture, voting—and
ignores social and economic rights such as education, health care, and social insurance.125
The only exceptions to this pattern are that the reports do have a section on the right to
unionize, which falls somewhere between an economic right (to representation in the
workplace) and civil right (to associate), and occasionally mention child welfare issues.
The reports do not comment on these omissions, which would appear quite substantial to
the rest of the world, which has mostly ratified the ICESCR and related treaties. The
unstated assumption is that the American conception of human rights is the same as the
international human rights which the reports address.
The United States has not consistently put economic and military pressure on
countries that violate civil and political rights. Like other countries, it makes exceptions
for friends and other important countries that it must do business with. For example, in
1993 President Clinton granted trade concessions to China subject to China improving its
human rights protections. A year later, however, President Clinton backed down from
linking China’s trading status to human rights in order to pursue a “new path” in the US’s
relations with China.126 Delinking human rights from trade was motivated by the US’s
124

See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
45–46 (2006) (“Abroad, we will work with our allies on three priorities: [1.] Promoting meaningful reform
of the U.N., including: Reinvigorating the U.N.’s commitment, reflected in the U.N. Charter, to the
promotion of democracy and human rights . . . [2.] Enhancing the role of democracies and democracy
promotion throughout international and multilateral institutions, including: [s]trengthening and
institutionalizing the Community of Democracies, [f]ostering the creation of regional democracy-based
institutions in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere, [and i]mproving the capacity of the U.N. and
other multilateral institutions to advance the freedom agenda through tools like the U.N. Democracy Fund .
. .”).
125
See, e.g., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2008,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/index.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
126
White House Office of Communications, President in Press Conference on China MFN Status, 1994
WL 209851 (May 27, 1994).

33

desire to secure China’s cooperation in persuading North Korea not to develop nuclear
weapons. The US also wanted to make sure it did not lose large trade deals, including
Chinese government’s aircraft orders, by insisting on progress on civil and political rights
in China.127
U.S. international rhetoric relentlessly promotes democracy, and has at least since
Woodrow Wilson. In his Fourteen Points speech that justified American entry into World
War I, Wilson stressed the right to self-determination, which has since been understood
to mean that nations should govern themselves by democratic means. 128 This right
appeared in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, which lay out the United States’ (and Britain’s)
goals in World War II.129 Throughout the Cold War, the United States described itself as
the leader of the “free world”—that part of the world in which democracy flourished. In a
famous article written in 1979, the future Reagan UN ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick,
justified American support for dictatorships in the Cold War on the ground that merely
authoritarian governments (as opposed to communist governments) might eventually
democratize.130
The collapse of communism and the end of cold war did not change the American
stance on democracy. Indeed, the U.S. government over three administrations has made a
concerted effort to claim that democracy is a norm of international law. The Clinton
administration declared its commitment to promote democracy in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, among other places.131 The Bush administration’s “freedom agenda” sought
to promote democracy in the Middle East.132 This policy supplied one of the rationales
for the Iraq War. As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama also declared his support for
promotion of democracy abroad, and in the first few months of his administration,
officials have expressed this policy on multiple occasions.133
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The United States has also promoted free trade and free markets for more than
half a century. The U.S. government initiated the GATT/WTO system in 1948,134 and its
commitment to maintaining and expanding this system has never wavered. During the
cold war, the United States distinguished itself from the Soviet Union in part on the basis
of its commitment to markets and the security of property rights. During this period, the
United States was also the leading critic of redistributive claims made by developing
countries. With the collapse of communism, the “Washington Consensus” emerged, a
bundle of policy prescriptions that emphasized macroeconomic stability, fiscal discipline,
privatization of government-owned resources, and liberalization of the economy.135 The
United States, predominantly through the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, pressured developing countries to adopt these policies, often making loans
conditional on significant reform in these directions. American institution-building after
the cold war—including the expansion of NATO, the inauguration of the North American
Free Trade Agreement and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, the development of
the GATT system with the creation of the WTO—were all designed to entrench
American political and economic values as global values.136
2. Military Force to Maintain Global Order
The United States believes in the use of military force in order to maintain global
order and, less explicitly, to advance democracy and human rights. During the cold war,
the United States pursued a policy of containment of the Soviet Union—an effort to
prevent the Soviet Union from extending its influence into other countries. The policy
took two forms: bolstering allies and undermining enemies, often with covert operations,
including the rendering of assistance to indigenous insurgencies. During the Cuban
missile crisis, the United States explicitly used military force in violation of the UN
Charter, when it blockaded Cuba (a traditional act of war); other interventions in Latin
American also were unilateral. After the cold war, the United States turned its focus on
“rogue states” that engaged in illegal conduct, and used force against, or threatened to use
force against, Panama, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.
In general, the United States has tried to give legal justifications for it use of
force. It has frequently cited authority under the UN Charter. The Korean War had
Community of Democracies delegates that “[o]ur common efforts reinforce the universality of the
democratic values and serve as a powerful response to those who would argue that democracy belongs only
to one region, or history or tradition” and listing the many regional “democratic backtracking” mechanisms
in the AU, OAS, EU, OSCE, and ASEAN).
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Security Council authorization. American participation in the Vietnam War occurred at
the invitation of the South Vietnamese government; hence, it was an example of
collective self-defense, which is authorized by the UN charter. The Gulf War had
Security Council authorization. So did the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The Iraq War
of 2003 was not explicitly authorized by the Security Council, but the United States went
to great lengths to justify the use of force on the basis of Security Council resolutions that
suspended hostilities against Iraq at the end of the 1991 war, conditional on Iraqi
cooperation in an inspection regime, which did not take place.
However, the United States has not always derived its authority from the UN
Charter. As noted above, in 1999 the United States, along with the other NATO
countries, launched an air attack on Serbia, which resulted in Serbia withdrawing from its
renegade province of Kosovo, which it had been trying to bring under control. Serbia had
long been a troublemaker in the Balkan, and had sowed disorder through its aggressive
military posture during the collapse of Yugoslavia from 1991 to the Dayton Peace
Accord of 1995.137 The collapse of stability in the region had immediate harmful impacts
on European countries, which had to deal with refugees. In addition, there was a great
deal of pressure to stop the atrocities that were taking place on all sides. The 1999
invasion had a number of motives—to support European allies, to prevent Serbians from
ethnically cleansing Kosovo of its Albanian stock, and to punish an international
troublemaker. The invasion lacked Security Council authorization.138
The United States did not always take a consistent line on its legal rationales for
the use of military force. But the most common themes were: Security Council
authorization; self-defense (including collective self-defense); and protection of
democratically elected governments (and sometimes authoritarian governments) from
foreign aggression. The Bush administration claimed at various points the right to launch
preemptive or preventive wars in self-defense. But the Bush administration and previous
American administrations never claimed that the United States has the exclusive right to
go to war for these purposes; the arguments were always made in universalistic terms.
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Similarly, the American attitude toward international criminal law has been
expressed in universalistic rhetoric. The United States refused to ratify the Rome Statute
creating the International Criminal Court and has expressed unhappiness with a range of
domestic statutes in foreign countries that permit prosecution of international crimes on
the basis of universal jurisdiction. In both cases, the United States feared politically
motivated prosecutions of American soldiers and politicians. It does not trust an
international body and foreign governments to treat Americans fairly. But the United
States never sought an exemption for Americans alone.139 Its original conception of the
ICC was that its authority would be conditional on Security Council authorization. Once
such authorization was secured, the ICC would be able to prosecute anyone in any
country.
B. Explaining American Exceptionalism
1. Domestic Policy Preferences: Markets, Liberty, Democracy
The United States is one of the world’s oldest continuous democracies and
democratic principles are deeply embedded in the political culture. The negative liberties
in the Bill of Rights have also been internalized by Americans and American institutions.
The United States’ commitment to free markets has helped give it the most powerful
economy in the world. Although this commitment to the market is often exaggerated—
local regulation is as old as the country, and national regulation of the market has made
significant inroads on laissez faire since the start of the twentieth century—there is no
doubt that Americans are more committed to markets than people in the other advanced
democracies.140 The American economy is also among the least regulated.141
Americans are also more optimistic about, and tolerant of, war than people living
in other advanced democracies, particularly in Europe. This can in part be attributed to
different historical experiences. The United States emerged as a victor of World War I,
having suffered battle deaths of 116,516 soldiers. 142 In comparison, France lost
139
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1,385,000, Germany lost 1,773,700, Britain lost 908,371, and Russia lost 1,700,000.143
France, Germany, and Britain had much smaller populations, of course. The United
States’ triumph in World War II was even more complete. The United States had
significant casualties—405,400 missing or killed—but far less than Germany (3.5 million
missing or killed), Japan (1.7 million missing or killed), and Russia (7.5 million missing
or killed).144 Cities throughout Europe were destroyed by the fighting; the United States
mainland was virtually untouched. 145 Europeans suffered from refugee crises, hunger,
and austerity in the aftermath of the war; American civilians enjoyed an economic boom.
Since then, the United States has fought a number of “small” wars—many of them
frustrating and inconclusive, with one defeat in Vietnam. But in none of these wars did
the United States lose more soldiers than France did in the World War I battle of Verdun
alone, which resulted in the deaths of 60,000 French soldiers.
Europeans and Americans derived different lessons from these experiences. In
Europeans one finds a deep strain of pacifism which is almost unknown in the United
States. While European governments joined NATO and fought in a few small wars, antimilitarism continues to dominate, particularly on the Continent. Note, however, that antimilitarism has not spread beyond Europe except for Japan. China, Russia, India, Israel,
and many other countries have maintained strong armies and fought major wars since
World War II—and China and Russia have suffered in twentieth-century wars to a degree
comparable to that of European countries.
2. Institutions: Populist Democracy and Powerful Military
From the institutional standpoint, three features about the United States stand out:
it is a democracy; it supports a market economy; and it has an enormous military. We
have already discussed the first two features: they reflect public opinion rooted in
tradition. More than that, they are institutions that are widely regarded as successful. It
seems natural for Americans to urge other countries to adopt similar institutions.
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But institutions matter in other ways. The democratic peace literature suggests
that democracies do not go to war with other democracies;146 they do go to war with nondemocracies. If this pattern reflects causal factors, then it is not surprising that
democracies would want other countries to be democracies if possible. The absence of
war may be just one manifestation of a deeper affinity among democracies, which allows
them to cooperate in many ways. Similarly, countries with developed market institutions
may prefer to deal with similar countries; trade is no doubt easier when institutions
resemble each other and reflect market imperatives. European integration, which began
as a customs union but progressed toward unification of economic policy and law, has
reflected these pressures. The U.S. government may seek to encourage other countries to
adopt American-style institutions because cooperation with such countries becomes
easier and more beneficial.
The EU shares the United States’ commitment to democracy. But this shared
commitment masks different political cultures. In European countries, the public tends to
defer to self-perpetuating political and bureaucratic elites. Elections are referenda on the
performance of the governing party; the political leaders themselves work their way up
the party hierarchy. American democracy has a strong populist skepticism of elites. The
political class is easily penetrated by unknowns who ride a wave of populist enthusiasm
(Jimmy Carter, Barack Obama, Sarah Palin, Ross Perot)—an almost unheard-of
phenomenon in Europe, where populists are kept at the fringes. The EU itself is governed
by a bureaucratic elite appointed by the political elites of its member states. Efforts to
overcome this widely recognized “democratic deficit” by transferring power to the
European Parliament have so far been unsuccessful.147
This divide may explain why European countries support international institutions
more readily than the United States does. These institutions, like the EU itself, are staffed
by the same kind of elite politician that governs European countries. Europeans,
accustomed to deferring to their leaders, also defer to the international institutions those
leaders create and staff. Americans, by contrast, distrust their leaders and, fearing a
backlash from the voters, American politicians are reluctant to insist that those voters
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submit to another, even more remote layer of bureaucratic governance at the international
level.
The third institutional feature—the enormous military—also sets the United
States apart from other states. It is an understatement to say that the United States is the
dominant military power in the world. In 2005, the United States spent $503 billion on
military expenditures, almost half of the $1.16 trillion spent worldwide.148 As Table 1
shows, in absolute terms United States spending dwarfs the amounts spent on the nine
next most expensive militaries.149 This was not always the case. The United States was a
military weakling in the nineteenth century up until World War I. But wealthy, populous
countries can become military powers and the United States did so during World War II.
Since then, its only rival has been the now-defunct Soviet Union.
Table 1: Countries with the Highest Military Expenditures, 2005150

Country
United States
China
United Kingdom
France
Japan
Germany
Italy
Russia
Saudi Arabia
India

Military Expenditures
(Billions)
$503.0
$85.3
$55.9
$52.9
$43.9
$38.1
$33.5
$31.1
$25.4
$18.8

The United States maintained an enormous military during the cold war because
of the Soviet threat. Accordingly, people believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union
would deliver a “peace dividend” in the form of smaller budgets. The era of small
military budgets was brief, however, as it became clear that the United States could use
military force to achieve its foreign policy aims. Indeed, the United States became
148
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embroiled in several more wars after the end of the cold war, culminating in the conflict
with al Qaeda.
It is hardly surprising, then, that the United States should try to protect its freedom
to use military force, just as it is not surprising that the United States should seek to
duplicate its democratic and market institutions in foreign countries. It is playing to its
institutional strengths. But in taking these positions, the United States uses universalistic
rhetoric. It does not claim that the United States alone should be able to use its military:
all countries have the same right to resort to military force under defined circumstances.
Similarly, democracy and free markets are not just the prerogatives of the United States:
all people should have access to democratic and market institutions.
V. ARE EXCEPTIONALIST STATES ALSO EXEMPTIONALIST?
We have argued that the great powers—including the US, the EU and China—
advance their exceptionalist views of international law in ways that reflect their
distinctive values and serve their particular interests. None of the exceptionalist states,
however, calls for a different set of rules that would apply to that state alone. Instead,
they call for a universal application of the international rules embedding their respective
exceptionalist vision. This is the key distinction between exceptionalism and
exemptionalism.
A. Rejecting American, European and Chinese Exemptionalism
In Part I, we disputed the contention that the United States is exemptionalist. As
we noted, there are no examples of the United States explicitly arguing that it is exempt
from the rules that apply to other countries. Like other great powers, the United States
advances a particular vision of international law that reflects its values, serves its
interests, and takes advantage of its institutional capacities. But its vision is universal, in
the sense that the rules and interpretations it advances are the same for all countries. The
US has frequently insisted that its norms and practices should provide the basis for
international law. This is different from the US exempting itself from the rules that apply
to other states.
It is also wrong to depict the EU as an exemptionalist power. Critics have pointed
out that the EU is a champion of multilateral trade liberalization yet the European single
market is the most extreme example of trade-diverting regionalism. Similarly, the EU
promotes the most-favored nation principle in the WTO yet maintains preferential trading

41

arrangements with Europe’s colonies. 151 But the EU is not seeking to carve out an
exemption for itself. Instead, the EU takes the stand that regionalism is compatible with
multilateralism; that regional trade blocks are building blocks and not stumbling blocks
for multilateral trade liberalization. Similarly, preferential trade agreements are consistent
with the principle of “special and differential treatment” of developing countries, the EU
claims.
It is also wrong to suggest that the EU’s voting practices amount to
exemptionalism.152 The EU is not enjoying the privilege of double-voting: depending on
whether the issue falls under the Community competence or the national competence, the
EU either casts the votes on behalf of the member states or the member states cast their
votes individually.153 The EU cannot vote independently in addition to the votes cast by
member states. 154 The practice of coordinating a negotiation position yet casting
individual votes is consistent with the character of the EU: the EU is not a state but a tight
economic community and a loose political union among 27 independent nation states.
That independent nation states each retain a right to vote is not exemptional.
The best argument for European exemptionalism comes from the global climate
change negotiations. The EU insisted it would be treated as a single state when
calculating the emissions that the EU members were entitled to under the Kyoto Protocol.
In practice this “Kyoto bubble” meant that some EU member states’ increases in
emission could be offset by emission reductions in others. 155 The EU first opposed a
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similar arrangement within other developed countries. This, some would argue, would
have amounted to EU exemptionalism. 156 However, other states rejected the EU’s
proposal for a sui generis treatment, and the EU agreed to allow emissions trading
between other states as well.157 Consequently, the possible (failed) exemptionalism in
connection with the climate change negotiations aside, the argument for the EU’s
exemptionalism remains thin.
China has also been accused of exemptionalism. Critics point to China’s
insistence on differential treatment to account for its developmental needs.158 However,
China does not argue that China alone should benefit from this principle. China argues
that, as a general rule, international obligations should be relaxed for developing
countries. This universal rule should apply to all, including (but not singling out) China.
It is not a coincidence that China is among the many beneficiaries of this universal rule.
No state advances international rules that are inconsistent with its national interests. But a
state pursuing a universal rule that is consistent with its interests is not the same as the
state embracing exemptionalism, even if that universal rule would at times lead to a state
being exempted from some international responsibilities.
To illustrate the difference between exceptionalism and exemptionalism, consider
income tax policy as an example from domestic law. Few would portray progressive
income tax policy as a kind of exemptionalism for the poor. Most people believe that
different individuals have “common but differentiated responsibilities” to pay taxes.
Progressive taxation reflects a public policy based on the idea of fairness and
redistribution. It can be contrasted with policies that exempt specified individuals from
paying their taxes. China does not seek to create a system that exempts China alone from
U.N.T.S. 194, arts. XXIV:5(a), XXIV:5(b). The idea is the same: offsetting emissions or trade barriers is
allowed as long as the EU as a whole ensures that a certain maximum level of tariffs or emissions is not
exceeded.
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its rules; it is seeking universal commitment to a “progressive” system of international
law with development-adjusted rights and responsibilities.
China is not the sole beneficiary of the developmentalist international order. The
World Bank classifies only sixty-six countries as high income countries.159 The rest are
commonly viewed as developing countries. China also acknowledges that some countries
are appropriately perceived as “least developed countries” that are entitled to even greater
flexibilities than China and other “wealthier developing countries.” Also, assuming that
China can maintain its trajectory of economic development, China will one day lose its
status as a developing country. Nothing in China’s international law rhetoric suggests that
any country, China included, would have an inherent or lasting basis of claiming a right
to special and differential treatment.
B. Exemptionalism and Violation of International Law
One might argue that states’ rhetoric is besides the point; what matters is their
behavior. The United States is exemptionalist because it violates international law that
does not suit its interests. It hardly matters that the United States does not admit that it
violates international law, or does not claim a de jure privilege to violate international
law that binds others. Behind the rhetoric, the United States engages in de facto
exemptionalism.
The problem with this argument is that all states violate international law some of
the time. For the United States, the bill of particulars includes the 2003 Iraq war, the 1999
Kosovo War, torture and extraordinary rendition in connection with the war on terror,
and a number of trade violations. For the EU, there is a similar list—the 1999 Kosovo
War, complicity in extraordinary rendition, trade violations, and—for a substantial group
of member states—the 2003 Iraq War. For China, an authoritarian state, one can point to
extensive human rights violations, including the suppression of political dissent and
religious freedom. Normal states also sometimes violate international law. Human rights
violations, including torture, and violations of countries’ WTO obligations are
widespread.160
Our argument is not that the United States violates international law less than
other countries do. We do not seek to, or even know how to, count up violations and
compare them. Our argument is different. It is that there is nothing distinctive about the
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United States, qualitatively speaking. Like the other major powers, and indeed like many
normal states, it sometimes violates international law. Either all states are exemptionalist,
in which case the term is useless, or none is.
A similar point can be made about behavior that falls short of international law
violation but that is in tension with a state’s exceptionalist stance on international law. As
we noted earlier, many people argue that the United States engages in double standards
when it coddles friendly dictators while proclaiming a commitment to human rights. The
EU engages in similar behavior, of course. Both the United States and the EU try to
maintain friendly relations with China, Russia, and other authoritarian states because of
their geopolitical and economic importance. These countries are simply balancing
objectives that are not always consistent—prosperity and security, on the one hand, the
promotion of human rights, on the other.
China does the same thing, but in the opposite direction. Having proclaimed the
inviolability of sovereignty, it has joined some resolutions condemning human rights
violations in other states.161 Doing so, China is compromising its stance on international
law for reputational reasons—it wants to maintain good relations with the human-rights
promoting states. As we noted above, China’s position on free trade and the right to
development is not always carried through consistently.162
In sum, all states have multiple objectives that are in tension with each other. The
compromises that results are just normal politics, not special behavior that deserves the
label of exemptionalism.
C. Embedded Exemptionalism in International Law
The above discussion has shown that none of the exceptionalist states is explicitly
exemptionalist. In forgoing exemptionalism, however, exceptionalist states do not forgo
their own interests. Exceptionalist states consistently take advantage of international
institutions that are constructed in ways that favor them. They have been central in
creating—and remain essential in maintaining— international institutions that embody
their influence and preferences. The formation of international institutions has enabled
exceptional states to create hierarchies, reinforce privileges, and institutionalize their
disproportionate influence over international law.
161

See supra note 92 and accompanying text (describing China’s decision to join in condemnation against
Myanmar).
162
For a book-length account of China’s compliance with international law, see generally Chan, supra note
119. Chan says that China’s compliance with arms control treaties is “satisfactory,” with trade treaties is
“good,” with human rights treaties is “fair to poor,” and with environmental protection treaties is “poor.”
Id. at 205.

45

The United Nations offers the most compelling example of the presence of
exemptionalism or “double standards” in international law. Americans, Europeans and
Chinese, (together with Russians) all enjoy a permanent seat and a right to a veto in the
UN Security Council. The UN Charter explicitly sets the exceptionalist states apart from
all other states and vests them with exclusive rights and responsibilities. This is the most
significant departure from the principle of sovereign equality of states. Most
commentators concede that the composition of the Security Council fails to correspond to
the distribution of power in today’s world.163 Some further question the fairness or the
legitimacy of the organization as a result.164 Still, granting the permanent five members
of the UN Security Council a privileged position among nations remains widely
accepted—if only because of the political infeasibility of any alternative: the current five
permanent members are unlikely to agree to empower other states by disempowering
themselves.165
A similar charge of “collective exemptionalism” or “double standards” may be
lodged against the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“NPT”). The
NPT divides states into nuclear and non-nuclear states and vests the two groups of states
with different rights and obligations. Under the Treaty, states that do not possess nuclear
weapons renounce any future acquisition of such weapons and undertake to pursue
nuclear technology only for civilian purposes. In contrast, states that do possess nuclear
weapons (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France—hence the
permanent members of the UN Security Council)166 undertake to pass nuclear technology
to non-nuclear weapon states only for peaceful purposes. Thus, like the UN Charter, the
NPT openly sets the exceptionalist (nuclear) states apart from normal (non-nuclear)
states. However, unlike the UN Charter, the NPT provides for a quid pro quo. The nonnuclear states have no obligation to enter the NPT and are free to develop nuclear
weapons technology without violating international law.

163

See, e.g., Jacob K. Cogan, Representation and Power in International Organization: The Operational
Constitution and Its Critics, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 209, 240 (2009) (listing various General Assembly
discussions on whether to change the composition of the Security Council and explaining the G-4’s bid for
seats in the Security Council).
164
See, e.g., David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J.
INT’L L. 552, 558–60 (1993) (explaining how perceptions of illegitimacy that arise when the organization
fails to live up to its “promise and spirit” may lead to failed negotiations).
165
Daniel W. Drezner, The New New World Order, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 34, 35 (2007) (suggesting the
European nations’ unwilling to “reduce their overrepresentation in multilateral institutions”); cf. Yehuda Z.
Blum, Proposals for UN Security Council Reform, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 632, 639–44 (2005) (analyzing the
potential power struggles that would result if countries tried to add seats to the Security Council).
166
India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, which are either commonly known or widely believed to own
nuclear weapons, are not participants to the NPT. (North Korea signed the Treaty, violated it and
subsequently withdrew from it.)

46

Similarly to the UN, the IMF and World Bank were set up after World War II to
reflect the distribution of power at that time, disproportionally favoring the US and the
European states. Americans and Europeans designed a voting system that allowed them
to dominate decision-making: though the United States only constitutes 5% of the
population of the IMF member states, it enjoys 17% of the votes—enough to give it a
single-handed veto right over all decisions—and Europeans control 40% of the vote,
despite only comprising 13% of the IMF member state population. This is particularly
striking when contrasted with the 5% voting share that China and India hold collectively.
The voting power in the World Bank mirrors that of the IMF. In addition, since the
founding of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944, the Europeans have chosen the head
of the former and nominated the head of the latter. This de facto control of both
institutions gives the US and the EU special status that allows them to grant loans and
debt relief based on geopolitical and ideological considerations.167
The WTO embodies a less hierarchical decision-making structure: It operates on
the principle of consensus and gives all member states an equal vote. In practice,
however, states with the largest economies drive the negotiation process. Similarly, the
enforcement of the WTO commitments remains largely the privilege of powerful states.
Powerful states may violate their trade commitments towards weaker trading partners,
knowing that weaker states are unlikely to carry out retaliation against them even if they
secure the WTO’s authorization to do so.168 Powerful states are therefore rarely targets of
trade sanctions,169 yet uniquely positioned to employ trade sanctions against their trade
partners.170 Though the WTO rules seem egalitarian on the surface, a closer look at the
operation of these rules reveals a familiar hierarchical structure, present in most
international institutions.
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There is a significant irony here. While the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and
many other international institutions have been criticized for their bias toward powerful
countries, the United Nations has avoided this charge. Yet the United Nations is the only
international institution that has the power to issue orders that legally bind all states while
giving a privileged group of states the power to ensure that those orders never apply to
them. Reform efforts have focused on expanding the group of states with veto power—
adding Germany, for example, or Japan, or Brazil, or India—but not in eliminating the
basic distinction between great powers with veto rights or other privileges, and ordinary
states without them. All states—exceptional as well as ordinary—appear to acquiesce in
the basic premise of the Security Council: that significant interventions to keep the peace
require the consent of the most powerful states but not the consent of other states.
If this system has exemptionalist overtones, it has nothing to do with
exceptionalism. No single exceptional state has authority in the UN system; instead,
authority is shared by a group of powerful states, some of them exceptional, some not.
The UN system does not reflect any single country’s distinctive vision; it reflects an
overlapping consensus among the great powers and ordinary countries.171
Now let us consider again the ICC. As we noted above, the EU sought to give the
ICC independent authority to initiate prosecutions and trials. The United States sought to
make the ICC’s authority depend on Security Council authorization, which would have
given the United States (and other permanent members) a right of veto, which would
have, in effect, immunized their citizens from prosecution. It is widely agreed that the EU
position was “universalistic,” while the American position was exemptionalist.
If this argument is correct, it reflects a deep irony. The U.S. position was just to
add the ICC to the Security Council’s long list of existing powers. Thus, the argument
boils down to a claim that increasing the power of the Security Council reflects an
exemptionalist agenda—even though the Security Council has a high level of
international legitimacy.
But there is a more serious problem with the argument. The claim that the United
States position is exemptionalist rests on a strong distinction between de jure and de
facto. The United States can argue that its position is (de jure) universal because no
special exception is made for Americans—Americans would not be granted immunity
under the Rome Statute as the United States envisioned it. The skeptics would respond
that the United States would be given de facto immunity because of its veto in the
Security Council. But an exemptionalist charge can also be turned against the Europeans.
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The Rome Statute, as ratified, is universalistic in the sense that it applies to all nations.
But, de facto, it does not apply to the Europeans because relatively few European soldiers
are sent into combat and European law enforcement authorities investigate and prosecute
international crimes and thus satisfy the complementarity provision of the Rome Statute.
The Rome Statute would create greater risks for the United States than for Europeans
because of the more frequent (and aggressive) use of military force by the former. So if
the United States’ position on the Rome Statute was exemptionalist, so was the European
position that was finally adopted—in the sense that both powers were determined to
ensure that their own soldiers would never have to stand a trial before the ICC.
Exemptionalism in this sense means a posture of advocating international treaties
that place burdens on other states and no burdens, or fewer burdens, on one’s own state.
There are many ways to do this. One could argue that obligations are contingent on the
approval of an institution in which one has a veto right (the United States position). Or
one could argue that obligations are such that one’s own state already satisfies them and
other states do not (the European position). The principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities is yet another version of this idea: here, developing states are given more
limited obligations than developed states. To condemn exemptionalism in this sense is to
condemn all states, because all states enter treaty negotiations with an eye to maximizing
their benefits and minimizing their burdens. It is hard to make sense of exemptionalism
except in the formal sense of demanding exemptions from general obligations of
international law. Otherwise, charges of exemptionalism are just a complaint that a state
fails to comply with international morality.
The essence of the debate over exemptionalism should now be clear. It is an
attempt to transform the debate about international morality, which is endlessly
contested, into a debate about formal legal compliance with the law, which can at least in
principle be resolved with legal methods. But the transformation fails. If exemptionalism
is understood in a substantive sense—all treaties should be “fair”—it does not differ from
international morality. If exemptionalism is understood in a formal sense—all states (or
all similarly situated states) should be subject to the same obligations—it does constrain
states. But by advocating universal legal obligations that burden other states and do not
burden themselves, states can avoid charges of exemptionalism in the formal sense
without sacrificing their interests.
CONCLUSION
There has been a long debate about American exceptionalism which, until
recently, has focused on American ideology, culture, and institutions. This debate has
focused on those aspects of American life that set it apart from the rest of the world;
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explanations have been sought in unique features of American history. The debate about
the relationship between American exceptionalism and foreign policy is more recent. In
this debate, scholars have again identified what seems to be unique about the United
States, but here focusing on American foreign policy. They have then tried to explain
how these distinctive features of American foreign policy have their source in America’s
unique history. The foreign policy debate, unlike the original debate, has a strongly
negative cast. American exceptionalism in foreign policy means that the United States
does not comply with the universal rules of international law—it prefers to maximize its
power or pursue idiosyncratic political ends.
Our main argument is that, although there is much to criticize in American foreign
policy, exceptionalism is not a useful target of criticism. Indeed, careful examination of
the critics’ arguments reveals that they are not concerned with American exceptionalism
or even exceptionalism per se; instead, they disapprove of American exceptionalism,
wishing that the United States displayed European exceptionalism—that is, the approach
to international law that European countries have taken. The above discussion has shown
that most powerful states are “exceptionalist” in the sense that they seek to embody their
values and interests in international law. The criticism of exceptionalism, then, is just a
criticism of power, or the use of power to achieve ends of which the critic disapproves.
Stronger complaints about exemptionalism (as opposed to exceptionalism) also
turn out to be unpersuasive. All states violate international law some of the time; it makes
little sense to call violators exemptionalists. If exemptionalism is understood to be the
posture that a state does not have to follow rules that apply to all other states, then no
state is exemptionalist; the category is empty. If exemptionalism is understood to be a
tendency to support treaties that place greater burdens on other countries and fewer (or
no) burdens on one’s own countries, then all states are exemptionalist. This is just a
normal part of international bargaining.
The United States, the EU, and China have particular visions of international law.
Neither of these visions is simply “correct” as a matter of international law: all of the
visions shape the content of international law. Scholars can do no better than evaluate
these competing visions on the basis of their normative appeal and institutional
sustainability, and argue for the vision (or some alternative) that they believe is best.
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